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Applying Title VII "Hostile Work
Environment" Analysis to Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 - An
Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-
to-Student Sexual Harassment in the
Schools
I. Introduction
Public schools are no longer immune from the allegations of sexual
harassment' that have continually faced employers,2 and more recently,
the military.' A recent survey of 1600 students in grades eight through
eleven revealed that roughly eighty percent had experienced some form
of sexual harassment while in school.4  This "epidemic"'  of sexual
harassment of students by teachers and fellow students is reflected in
the number of cases which have been litigated.6
1. One definition of sexual harassment is "the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements
in the context of a relationship of unequal power." CATHARNE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 1 (1979). It has also been defined as "unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual
nature, made by someone from or in the work or educational setting... 26 CAL EDUC. CODE
§ 212.5 (West Supp. 1992).
2. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. CL 367 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
3. See generally John Lancaster, In Military Sex Harassment Cases, His Word Often
Outranks Hers, WASI. POST, Nov. 15, 1992, at Al (detailing the struggle of women to combat
sexual harassment in the military).
4. See Mary Jordan, Sex Harassment Complaints Starting in Grade School Taunts,
Intolerance on the Rise, WASH. POST, June 2, 1993, at Al. The survey, conducted by Louis Harris
& Associates for the American Association of University Women (AAUW), reported that 85% of
girls and 76% of boys said they had been sexually harassed at schooL See id
5. Id. Alice McKee, president of the AAUW Educational Foundation, termed sexual
harassment in classrooms "epidemic."
6. See, e.g., Blake v. Dickason, 997 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1993) (alleging that a teacher
sexually assaulted a high school student); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir.
1993) (alleging that a male student sexually molested a fellow male student in a special education
class for the mentally retarded); Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 996 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1993)
(alleging that a teacher sexually assaulted a first grade student); Thelma D. v. Board of Educ., 934
F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1991) (alleging that elementary school students were sexually abused by a
teacher); D.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 879
(1990) (alleging that elementary school students were sexually abused by a teacher); J.O. v. Alton
Comm. Unit Sch. Dist, 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990) (alleging that a teacher sexually abused
students); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (alleging that a
junior high school student was sexually harassed by her peers); Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ.,
799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (alleging that a high school student was harassed and assaulted
by classmates).
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Two relatively recent cases brought under different federal statutes
indicate that the state of the law in this area remains unsettled.
The more promising decision for future victims of sexual
harassment in the schools was rendered by the Supreme Court in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.7 In Franklin, a female
high school student brought an action for damages under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 19728 against her school district alleging
that she had been subjected to sexual harassment and abuse by a
teacher.9 The Supreme Court determined for the first time that a
damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title
IX. 10  In the second case, D.R v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational
Technical School," two female high school students unsuccessfully
brought an action for damages against the school district and various
school officials and teachers under Section 1983,12 alleging that they
had been physically, verbally, and sexually molested by several male
students. 3 The Third Circuit rejected the students' Section 1983 claim
which alleged that the defendants had deprived them of "a liberty
interest in their personal bodily integrity protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution. 4
In light of these two decisions, this Comment discusses whether
Title IX is violated when female students are sexually harassed by male
students.' 5 Specifically, this Comment argues that female students
who are sexually harassed by their male classmates are victims of sex
discrimination and should be protected under Title IX, 6 as their
7. 112 S. CL 1028 (1992).
8. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (1988). The purpose of Title IX is to end discrimination based on
gender in any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at §
1681(a).
9. Franklin, 112 S. CL at 1031.
10. Id. at 1038.
11. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (7-5 decision), cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1045
(1993).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The purpose of Section 1983 is to protect individuals from a
deprivation of their constitutional rights by a person acting under the color of state law. See id.
13. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1366.
14. Id. at 1368 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982); Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1973)).
15. For convenience, the male pronoun is used in this Comment when referring to the
harasser, and the female pronoun is used when referring to the victim. Although sexual
harassment affects both boys and girls in nearly equal numbers, see supra note 4, only twenty-four
percent of harassed boys reported feeling "very" or "somewhat upset" right after being harassed,
while the figure was seventy percent for girls. Jordan, supra note 4, at Al.
16. See Jerry Adler with Debra Rosenberg, Must Boys Always Be Boys?, NEWSWEEK, Oct
19, 1992, at 77 (discussing the potential of Title IX to remedy cases of student-to-student sexual
harassment).
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female counterparts in the workplace are protected from co-worker
created "hostile environment"'" sexual harassment under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964."8 Section H1 discusses the limited
success of plaintiffs who have sought a remedy under Section 1983 for
sexual harassment in the schools. Section III discusses the various
remedies now available under Title IX. Section IV discusses the
evolution of the hostile environment sexual harassment theory in the
workplace under Title VII. Section V establishes several links for
applying a Title VII analysis to Title IX. Section VI analogizes
students to employees, compares the discrimination suffered by
employees to the discrimination suffered by students in a hostile
environment, and discusses the potential liability of the schools.
Finally, Section VII concludes that holding schools accountable for
hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX will help
eliminate this type of sex discrimination.
II. The Pitfalls of a Section 1983 Action in the Schools' 9
To prevail in a Section 1983 case, a plaintiff must sufficiently
allege that a state actor deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the
Constitution.20 An analysis of a Section 1983 action brought against
a school begins with DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of
17. Two types of sexual harassment have been found to constitute sex discrimination in the
workplace: quidpro quo and hostile environment See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 62 (1986). Quidpro quo sexual harassment directly links sexual harassment to the grant or
denial of specific economic employment benefits. Id. at 65. Hostile environment sexual
harassment recognizes that sexual harassment can create a hostile or offensive work environment
even when economic benefits are not affected. Id Although it is possible for a female student
to be the victim of quid pro quo sexual harassment from a male student (e.g., a male student's
conditioning the selection of a female student to a school committee upon her granting of sexual
favors to him), this Comment is limited to a discussion of the more likely scenario where student-
to-student sexual harassment creates a hostile environment
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Title VII was enacted to prevent discrimination
in the workplace on the basis of race, sex, religion, color, and national origin. Id at § 2000e-
2(a)(1)-(2). To date, only one district court in the country has addressed the viability of a claim
for student-to-student hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX. See Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (permitting hostile environment sexual
harassment claim under Title MQ. See also Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist, 830 F.
Supp.. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (permitting plaintiff to state a claim for teacher-to-student hostile
environment sexual harassment under Title IX).
19. Although the focus of this Comment is the applicability of Title IX to student-to-student
sexual harassment, a brief overview of the problems inherent in Section 1983 litigation in this
context points to the need for an alternative course of action.
20. D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir.
1992), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
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Social Services.21 In DeShaney, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 22 limits a state's
23power to act. The Court asserted that the Due Process Clause does
not impose an affirmative duty upon a state to protect its citizens from
private actors." The DeShaney Court did acknowledge that under
limited circumstances such as incarceration, institutionalization, and
"other similar restraints," the Constitution may impose upon a state an
affirmative duty to protect particular individuals with whom it has a
"special relationship" based on physical custody.25  However, the
Court clearly determined that an affirmative duty is not created in every
situation.26
The plaintiffs in D.Ii v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School 7  contended that compulsory school attendance laws,28
coupled with the school defendants' exercise of in loco parentis29
authority over them during school hours, equaled a restraint on their
personal liberty such that they were effectively in the state's custody
during school hours. 3' The plaintiffs alleged that the school
defendants had an affirmative duty to protect them from the physical,
verbal, and sexual molestation inflicted upon them by their male
classmates.3"
Applying a DeShaney analysis to the facts of Middle Bucks, the
Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the school
21. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o State shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
23. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 200. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 331 (1982) (requiring states
to provide involuntarily committed mental patients with such services as are necessary to ensure
their "reasonable safety'); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (requiring states to provide
adequate medical care to incarcerated criminals). A custodial relationship has also been found
between a state and foster children. See, e.g., Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(and cases cited therein), cer. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1991).
26. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. In DeShaney, the Court determined that a state social service
agency did not have an affirmative duty to protect a four-year-old boy from his abusive father
although the agency was aware of the abuse and was monitoring the situation. The Court held that
the agency neither created the abusive situation nor made the child more vulnerable to it. Id. at
201. The child's father ultimately beat his son until he was permanently brain-damaged. Id. at
193.
27. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
28. Id. at 1367 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1326--13-1330 (1962 & Supp. 1991)).
29. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1367, (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 13-1317 (1962 & Supp.
1991)). In loco parenis refers to the statutory authority given to school officials to assume the
disciplinary role of parents while the students are at school. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1367.
30. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1370.
31. Id.
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defendants had an affirmative duty to protect the plaintiffs from
harm. 2 The Third Circuit determined that the plaintiffs were not in
the physical custody of the school defendants during the school day;
thus a special relationship did not arise between the plaintiffs and the
school defendants.33 Instead, the Third Circuit reasoned that parents
or others assume responsibility to provide for a child's needs, care, and
guidance and that both students and parents "retain substantial freedom
to act."
34
Courts have consistently refused to apply Section 1983's analytical
framework in the school setting. 3 The Third Circuit did acknowledge
that very young children may be physically restrained from leaving
school, 36 but did not address whether a "special relationship" analysis
may be successful when applied to elementary school students.37
32. Id. at 1371.
33. Id. at 1373.
34. Id. at 1372-73 (quoting J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th
Cit. 1990)).
35. See, e.g., Black v. Indiana Area ScL Dist, 985 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding no
special relationship between school superintendent and student who was molested by school bus
driver); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that state-
mandated school attendance laws do not create a custodial relationship between school district and
student sexually assaulted by another student); Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035
(10th Cit. 1993) (no deliberate deprivation of constitutional rights when teacher assaulted high
school student); Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Scl Dist., 996 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1993) (no deliberate
indifference on part of school district for retention of known abusive teacher); Maldonado v. Josey,
975 F.2d 727 (10th Cit. 1992) (no constitutional deprivation where boy became caught in his
bandanna in a cloakroom and died of strangulation), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 1266 (1993); Thelma
D. v. Bd. of Educ., 934 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding school board not liable for teacher's
sexual abuse of students absent a showing that it either had knowledge of the teacher's
unconstitutional conduct or that its procedures for addressing child abuse in schools were
inadequate); J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1990) (compulsory
attendance laws do not produce an affirmative duty for school authorities to prevent a teacher from
sexually molesting a student); B.M.H. v. Sch. Bd. of the City of Chesapeake, 833 F. Supp. 560
(E.D. Va. 1993) (no affirmative duty by teachers or school system to protect student from assault
by another student); Cohen v. School Dist of Phila., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4794 (E.D. Pa. 1992)
(no affirmative duty to protect student from physical assault by another student); Russell v. Fannin
County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (no affirmative duty to protect student from
physical assault by another student); contra Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1992) (school superintendent and principal have a constitutionally-based affirmative duty to protect
a student from sexual molestation by a state-employed teacher), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066
(1993); C.M. v. Southeast Delco Sch. Dist., 828 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that states
have an affirmative duty to protect students in public schools from abusive conduct by their
teachers).
36. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372-73 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670
(1977)).
37. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372-73. The dissent in Middle Bucks argues that immature
school children should be owed "no less a remedy than we are willing to provide to incarcerated
criminals." Id. at 1384 (Sloviter, C.J., joined by Mansman, Scirica, and Nygaard, JJ., dissenting).
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Alternative arguments may be postulated under Section 1983,38 but
given the trend of court decisions in applying Section 1983 in the
schools, this area of relief is not promising. 9
III. Remedies Available Under Title IX
As discussed in the preceding section, a student victim of sexual
harassment may encounter difficulty in proving that school defendants
deprived the student of a constitutionally protected right under Section
1983. Despite this difficulty, a Section 1983 action for student-to-
student sexual harassment is attractive to plaintiffs because both legal
and equitable relief are available.4° The Supreme Court's decision in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools41 to permit a damages
remedy, as well as equitable relief under Title IX,42 now provides
plaintiffs with many of the same benefits available under Section 1983.
Access to federal court,43 recoupment of attorney's fees,44 and
avoidance of state law immunities under state tort claims45 incorporate
the benefits of a Section 1983 claim while avoiding some of its
pitfalls.46 Additionally, unlike Section 1983 which bars "respondeat
38. See Daniel A. Farber, Government Liability After DeShaney, TRIAL, May 1989, at 18.
Avenues for finding an affrmnative duty on the states under Section 1983 include: establishing the
custodial relationship; finding that the state created a risk or made a person more vulnerable to
one; finding that the state selectively denied protection to disfavored minorities; proving a lack of
procedural due process under an "entitlement" theory provided by state statute; or proving that the
government has guaranteed protection to a class of victims but has arbitrarily denied the protection
to one member of the class. Id. at 20.
39. For a persuasive argument which applies special relationship custodial analysis in the
schools, see generally, Steven F. Huefner, Note, Affirmative Duties in the Public Schools After
DeShaney, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1940 (1990). Huefner argues that the control which schools
exercise over students and the educational environment requires that public schools offer some
protection to their students or face liability under Section 1983.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (granting relief to an injured party in suits both at law and in
equity).
41. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992). See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this case.
42. Id. at 1038.
43. A plaintiff may perceive that litigating in federal court is more favorable than state court
because federal judges are appointed for life, federal courts typically have smaller caseloads and
move more quickly, defendants may be unfamiliar with federal court, and other perceived
advantages. JONATHAN M. LANDERS, JAMES A. MARTIN & STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL
PROcEDURE 3 (2d ed. 1988).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The Attorney's Fees Award Act (§ 1988) provides for recovery
of attorney's fees under both § 1983 and Title IX. Id.
45. See generally, E. REUrrER, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 329 (1985) (explaining that
school districts are often immune from suit for claims brought under state law). Congress has
provided that a state shall not be immune from suit under Title IX. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1988).
46. See supra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
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superior"" liability, the holding in Franklin appears to impose
respondeat superior liability under Title IX for intentional sex
discrimination.4"
This section will discuss the history of Title IX, review the
litigation leading up to the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin, and
explore the Court's rationale for to allowing a damages remedy under
Title IX. By establishing that a remedy is available under Title IX to
a student who was sexually harassed by a teacher, it follows that the
same remedy should be available to a student victimized by another
student.
A. The History and Purpose of Title IX
Title IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.4' The purpose of Title VI is to end discrimination based on
race, color or national origin in any program or activity receiving
federal fimds, 0 including discrimination in educational institutions.5
Title IX was enacted to eliminate sex discrimination in educational
institutions receiving federal funds.52 Title IX provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
47. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1578 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (citing
Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Respondeat
superior refers to an employer's liability for injury caused to a person proximately resulting from
the acts of an employee done within the scope of employment in the employer's service. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (6th ed. 1990).
48. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1038. By allowing monetary damages payable by the school
district, the Court implied that the school district is responsible for the intentional sexual
harassment committed by its employee. Id. See also Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F.
Supp. 1560, 1575 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (interpreting Franklin to hold that respondeat superior liability
is imputed to the institution for the intentional discrimination of one of its agents); William D.
Valente, Liability for Teacher's Sexual Misconduct with Students - Closing and Opening Vistas,
74 EDUC. L. REP. 1021, 1030 (1992) (discussing the broader relief available under Title IX for a
theory of vicarious liability as compared to § 1983).
49. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514 (1982). Title VI is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000d.2000d-6 (1988).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Title VI provides that "[no person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance." Id.
51. See 34 C.F.R. pt. 100 app. B (1991) (restricting discrimination in public school systems).
52. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1988). Prior to the enactment of Title IX, Senator Birch Bayh
commented that "[d~iscrimination against the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs and
activities is already prohibited by Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but unfortunately the
prohibition does not apply to discrimination on the basis of sex." 228 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
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discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance ....
In Cannon v. University of Chicago,4 the Supreme Court held
that like Title VI, Title IX is enforceable through a private cause of
action.5 In Cannon, the petitioner was permitted to maintain her
gender discrimination lawsuit against private universities which received
federal financial assistance after she was excluded from their medical
schools. 56  By meeting the requirements of a four-prong test
established by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash,57 the Cannon Court
inferred that Congress intended to provide a remedy under Title IX,
despite the absence of language in the statute expressly authorizing a
private cause of action. 58  Applying the Cort test, the Court first
determined that as a woman, Cannon was a member of the class Title
IX was designed to protect.59 Second, by patterning Title IX after
Title VI which allowed a private right of action, the legislators assumed
that a private cause of action would be available under Title IX as
well.6" Third, a private remedy would achieve Title IX's statutory
purpose by protecting individual citizens from discriminatory
practices. 6' Finally, the government's expenditure of federal funds
justified its interest in eliminating discriminatory practices.62
B. The Title LY Remedy: Conflict Among the Circuits
Although Cannon established a private right of action under Title
IX, a question remained as to the type of remedy which could be
provided. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,63 the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that 'Vte existence of a cause of action by
no means assures a right to an unlimited array of remedies."'  In
contrast, the Third Circuit in Pfeiffer v. School Board for Marion Center
Area,6" declined to follow the lead of Franklin and other circuits'
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
54. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
55. Id. at 717.
56. Id.
57. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
58. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689.
59. Id. at 693.
60. Id. at 703.
61. Id. at 706.
62. Id. at 708.
63. 911 F.2d 617 (1lth Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. CL 1028 (1992).
64. Franklin, 911 F.2d at 619.
65. 917 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1990).
66. See, e.g., Lieberman v. University of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185, 1188 (7th Cir. 1981)
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and determined that both legal and equitable relief were available under
Title IX.67 In Pfeiffer, the Third Circuit determined that the equitable
remedies available to a female student who was dismissed from the
honor society because she was pregnant were rendered moot by her
graduation and the subsequent dissolution of the honor society.' In
deciding that compensatory damages are available under Title IX,69 the
Third Circuit reasoned that if equitable relief was no longer a viable
option, then "an exercise to find liability without finding a remedy
would be an exercise in futility."70
C. The Decision to Provide a Remedy Under Title IX
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools7 to resolve the conflict among the circuits. 2
The petitioner, Christine Franklin, brought suit under Title IX seeking
compensatory damages from Gwinnett County Public Schools.73
Franklin alleged that she had been intentionally discriminated against on
the basis of sex after a teacher sexually harassed her.74
To determine if a damages remedy is available under Title IX, the
Court reasoned that unless Congress expressly indicates otherwise, all
appropriate remedies are presumed available.75 Historically, courts
have been able to use any available remedy to right a legal wrong as
long as a federal statute provided the right to sue.76 The Court
recognized that the remedies available under Title IX were not
expressly stated in the statute, but in following its holding in Cannon
which inferred a private cause of action under the statute," the Court
determined that the remedies could be inferred as well.S Finally, the
Court reasoned that since Congress had not amended Title X to limit
(holding that Congress, not the courts, must establish a right to damages under Title IX), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982).
67. Pfeiffer, 917 F.2d at 788.
68. Id. at 786.
69. Id. at 788.
70. Id. at 786.
71. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
72. Id at 1032.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1031. The teacher allegedly engaged Christine Franklin in sexually oriented
conversations, forcibly kissed her on the mouth, contacted her at home to request that she meet
him socially, and on three occasions had Franklin removed from class to subject her to coercive
sexual intercourse. Id.
75. Id. at 1032 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979)).
76. Franklin, 112 S. CL at 1033.
77. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
78. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1035.
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the available remedies in the two decades since the statute was first
passed, Congress must not have intended to limit remedies.7 9
The Court then dismissed each of the respondents' arguments
against expanding the remedies available under Title IX to include
monetary relief.50  The Court first concluded that using judicial
discretion to fashion a remedy is not a violation of the separation of
powers principle." Next, the Court opined that in cases of intentional
discrimination, such as occurred in Franklin, relief is not limited under
Congress' Spending Clause because the entity receiving the federal
funds had notice it would be liable for a monetary award. 2 Finally,
the Court reasoned that limiting Title IX remedies to equitable relief is
contrary to the notion that a remedy should first be sought at law.
8 3
In Franklin, awarding equitable relief would have been useless because
Ms. Franklin had already graduated and the teacher forced to resign.
84
D. The Implications of a Title 1X Damages Remedy
The Supreme Court's decision to provide both legal and equitable
relief under Title IX makes it a more powerful tool for fighting sex
discrimination in the schools. Forcing states to pay monetary awards
out of their treasuries will make public schools more accountable for
intentional violations of Title IX. 5 Holding states accountable for
violations of Title IX will, in turn, provide greater incentive for schools
to eliminate sex discrimination. Greater accountability will also ensure
that Congress is not expending federal money to support intentional sex
discrimination. 86 Finally, an assortment of available remedies will
ensure that student victims of sex discrimination at school are not left
without remedy.
To be afforded the relief now available under Title IX, a victim of
student-to-student sexual harassment must establish that this type of
79. Id. at 1036.
80. Id. at 1037-38.
81. Id. at 1037. The Court determined that once a cause of action is created under the
Constitution or laws of the United States by the Executive or Legislative branches, a court must
have the power to fashion a remedy or its power to enforce the laws will be useless. Id
82. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037-38. Following its decision in Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624 (1984), the Franklin Court determined that monetary awards are authorized
under spending clause statutes such as Title IX for intentional violations. Id at 1037.
83. Franklin, 112 S. CL at 1038.
84. Id.
85. Id. See also infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
accountability.
86. Franklin, 112 S. Ct at 1037.
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harm is a form of sex discrimination."7 As a means of illustrating how
this may be accomplished, focus must shift to the workplace, where
sexual harassment theories were first developed and successfully
litigated under Title VII. 8
IV. Sexual Harassment Actions Under Title VII
As discussed in the preceding section, a student who is
discriminated against on the basis of sex may now seek damages
through a private right of action under Title IX. The challenge for a
victim of student-to-student sexual harassment is in establishing that the
sexual harassment which creates a hostile environment in the classroom
is discriminatory, regardless of whether the harasser is a teacher or a
classmate. This section will examine the treatment of hostile
environment sexual harassment in the employment context under Title
V1189 as a basis for analogizing Title VII to Title IX.
A. The Evolution of Title VII Sexual Harassment Litigation
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was designed to eliminate
discrimination with respect to an individual's "compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."'  Sexual harassment may
include "[ujnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... , The
Supreme Court has recognized that both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment in the workplace are types of sex
discrimination which violate Title VII.'
An action for a hostile work environment was first recognized in
Rogers v. EEOC.93. In Rogers, the Fifth Circuit held that an Hispanic
employee was entitled to protection under Title VII when her employer
created an offensive work environment by providing discriminatory
treatment to its Hispanic clientele.94 The Fifth Circuit recognized the
connection between a discriminatory work environment and the
"emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers"
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)-(2).
88. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (and cases cited therein).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
90. Id. at § 2000e-2(aXl).
91. 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a) (1992).
92. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). See supra note 17 for
definitions of quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.
93. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1973).
94. Id. at 239.
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which would amount to an unlawful employment practice under Title
V11. 95
Courts subsequently applied the hostile environment principle to
harassment based on race,96  religion,97  and national origin. 9
Finally, in Bundy v. Jackson,99 the D.C. Circuit Court held that sexual
'harassment was a condition of employment which violated Title VII
when a hostile environment was created.1"' In Bundy, a female
employee was subjected to sexual propositions and sexual questioning
from a co-worker and two supervisors." 1 The court reasoned that
unless hostile environment sexual harassment was considered a violation
of Title VII, an employer could harass an employee and get away with
it by stopping short of conditioning the harassment upon a tangible job
benefit."°
B. The Supreme Court's Decision on Sexual Harassment
The Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of sexual
harassment in employment in the landmark case of Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson.10 3  In Vinson, Mechelle Vinson brought a sexual
harassment suit against her supervisor and Meritor Savings Bank
alleging that her supervisor had sexually assaulted her over the course
of four years.0 4  Vinson was eventually fired from her job as an
assistant branch manager for taking excessive sick leave." °5
Finding no limiting language in Title VII itself,1"6 the Court
explicitly recognized both the quid pro quo and hostile work
environment theories of sexual harassment."0 7 The Court relied on
lower court decisions to determine that requiring women to endure
sexual harassment as a condition of employment violates Title VI.' 0 8
95. Id. at 238.
96. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (8th Cir. 1976).
97. See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
98. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977).
99. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
100. Id. at 946.
101. Id. at 939-40.
102. Id. at 945.
103. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
104. Id. at 60. Vinson's supervisor allegedly sexually propositioned her, intimidated her into
submitting to undesired sexual intercourse, fondled her in front of other employees, followed her
into the restroom, exposed himself to her, and raped her on several occasions. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 64.
107. inson, 477 U.S. at 65.
108. Id. at 66-67 (citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
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Sexual harassment results in a hostile work environment when the
harassment is "severe and pervasive" and 'he conditions of [the
victim's] employment . .. create an abusive work environment."' 10 9
The Court further held that voluntariness on the victim's part is not a
defense as long as the sexual advances are "unwelcome.""'
Hostile environment sexual harassment case law is well developed
under Title VII. The next section examines how courts have applied
Title VII case law under Title IX. By establishing a connection
between the two statutes, it follows that hostile environment sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII should also be actionable under
Title IX.
V. Links Between Title VII and Title IX
In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,"' the Supreme
Court declined the opportunity to decide whether the outright
prohibitions on discrimination under Title VII applied by analogy to
Title IX as well." 2 However, the Court in Franklin did analogize
Title VII to Title IX when, by borrowing language from Vinson, it
stated: "[W]hen a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student" it is
identical to the employment context "when a supervisor sexually
harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, [the] supervisor
[has] discriminate[d] on the basis of sex.""13 Two California district
court cases are the only ones to date that have interpreted Franklin's
comparison of employees to students to mean that hostile environment
sexual harassment analyses developed under Title VII are applicable to
Title IX in the public schools."' Previous case law also linked the
two statutes, albeit indirectly." 5
109. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
110. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 68.
111. 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992).
112. Id at 1032 n.4. The Court declined to decide whether Title VII applied by analogy to
Title IX because Franklin did not pursue this contention on appeal.
113. Id. at 1037 (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64).
114. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993); Patricia H. v.
Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
115. For a discussion of possible links between Title VI, Title VII, and Title IX from a
legislative standpoint, see Kimberly A. Mango, Comment, Students Versus Professors: Combatting
Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 23 CoNN. L. REv. 355,
384-90 (1991). See also, Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65
TEX. L. REV. 525, 543-53 (1987) (arguing that a Title VII hostile environment theory should be
applied under Title IX when a professor sexually harasses a student).
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A. Building the Chain
The first case to consider whether a student had a claim for sexual
harassment against a professor under Title IX was Alexander v. Yale
University. 16 In Alexander, five women sought an order requiring
Yale to institute a grievance procedure for victims of sexual
harassment." 7 The women alleged that Yale's refusal to implement
a grievance procedure interfered with the educational process and
denied them an equal opportunity in education in violation of Title
IX.118 Two of the plaintiffs' sexual harassment claims ranged from
repeated sexual advances and coerced intercourse to demands for sex
in return for high grades.'19 The three other plaintiffs alleged that
absence of grievance procedures and exposure to an educational
environment rife with sexual harassment caused them emotional
distress.120
The district court did recognize that quid pro quo sexual
harassment is actionable under Title IX when grades are conditioned on
compliance with sexual demands. The court stated that it is "perfectly
reasonable to maintain that academic advancement conditioned upon
submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in
education, just as questions of job retention or promotion tied to sexual
demands from supervisors have become increasingly recognized as
potential violations of Title VII's ban against sex discrimination in
employment. 121  The district court found, however, that the plaintiff
failed at trial to sufficiently allege that sexual harassment had actually
occurred.122
The Second Circuit affinned the district court's dismissal of all of
the plaintiffs' complaints.'23 As to the four plaintiffs whose cases
were dismissed because graduation rendered their claims moot, the
Second Circuit opined that 'their graduations appear to prevent the
116. 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980).
117. Id. at 180.
118. Id. at 181.
119. Id. at 181-82. Plaintiff Ronni Alexander alleged that she found it impossible to continue
playing the flute and gave up her ambition of playing the flute professionally because of her
professor's repeated sexual advances and coerced sexual intercourse. Id. at 181. Plaintiff Pamela
Price alleged that she received a grade of "C" in a class after she refused to comply with her
professor's sexual demands. Alexander, 631 F.2d at 182.
120. Id. at 182.
121. Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977), afftd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1980).
122. Alexander, 631 F.2d at 185.
123. Id. at 182.
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courts both from redressing the predominant injury relied upon -
deprivation of an education environment free from condoned
harassment - and from awarding the relief requested - an order
directing Yale to institute effective procedures for receiving and
adjudicating complaints of sexual harassment." '124  While the
plaintiffs' graduations prevented the Second Circuit from applying a
hostile environment sexual harassment analysis, the court appeared to
recognize that such a claim may be actionable.
In Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine,125 a third-year
medical student alleged that she was sexually harassed by medical staff
members during her psychiatric clerkship.'2 6 The district court
determined that the sexual harassment doctrine developed under Title
VII is equally applicable to Title IX.' 27 The court first determined
that a quid pro quo analysis was not applicable to the facts of Moire
because the harassment complained of was not conditioned on the grant
or denial of a benefit. 2 The court then applied a hostile environment
analysis and concluded that the plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to
establish that she was the victim of sex discrimination. 129
The First Circuit in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico 3'
determined that application of Title VII case law to Title IX in an
employment context was appropriate. 131 In Lipsett, the plaintiff was
a female medical resident who was both an employee of the University
as well as a student in the resident program. 3 2  The First Circuit
adopted both the quid pro quo and hostile environment theories in
analyzing this "mixed employment-training" context. 33  Lipsett's
status as an employee first, and a student second, persuaded the court
to apply the Title VII sexual harassment theories under Title IX' 34
Though the court premised its decision to apply Title VII reasoning to
Title IX on Lipsett's status as an employee, it seems likely that the next
124. Id at 184.
125. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
126. Id. at 1362.
127. Id. at 1366 n.2.
128. Id. at 1366-67.
129. Id at 1370. The court found that comments to Moire regarding her attractiveness were
made only with respect to the impact this would have on her patients, and further, the court found
that she was not the victim of a harassing environment Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1369.
130. 864 F.2d 881 (lst Cir. 1988).
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step would be to apply sexual harassment theories in non-employment
contexts under Title IX as well.
Most recently, two California district courts applied hostile
environment sexual harassment theories developed under Title VII to
Title IX. In Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified School District,135 the
plaintiffs, a mother and her two daughters, alleged that the girls had
been sexually molested off school grounds by a teacher who was their
mother's boyfriend at one time. 36  Consequently, the plaintiffs
alleged that the mere presence of this teacher in their school created a
hostile environment that deprived them of full enjoyment of their
education in violation of Title IX.137
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court was asked to
consider whether Title IX "proscribes the maintenance of a sexually
hostile educational environment in any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance."' 38  Based on an analysis of
Franklin and previous Title VII case law, the court answered this
"novel question"'39 by concluding that a claim for teacher-to-student
hostile environment sexual harassment is actionable under Title IX.' 4°
Closely following the district court's decision in Patricia H. was
Doe v. Petaluma City School District.4' In Doe, the court was faced
with the question of whether a claim for student-to-student hostile
environment sexual harassment is also actionable under Title IX.' 42
The plaintiff in Doe reported constant verbal sexual harassment, threats,
and one assault during the seventh and eighth grades.' 43 Concurring
with the reasoning in Patricia H., the court found that student-to-student
hostile environment sexual harassment is also actionable under Title IX.
The court stated that "surely one is 'denied the benefits of, or subjected
to discrimination under' an education program on the basis of sex when,
135. 830 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
136. Id. at 1294-95.
137. Id. at 1296. The teacher in this case taught band and jazz at various schools throughout
the school district. Id.
138. Id. at 1289.
139. Patricia H., 830 F. Supp. at 1290.
140. Id. at 1289-93. The court cited Franklin for the proposition that "a student should have
the same protection in school that an employee has in the workplace." Id. at 1292.
141. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
142. Id. at 1573. The court noted that no court had addressed student-to-student sexual
harassment under Title IX. Id.
143. Id. at 1564-65. The plaintiff reported being called "hot dog bitch," "slut," and "hoe"
(slang for whore) by both male and female classmates. Id. at 1565. Plaintiff was also threatened
for telling school authorities about the incidents, was humiliated in class and in the lunchroom, had
derogatory comments written about her on the bathroom walls, and on one occasion was slapped
by another student Doe, 830 F. Supp. at 1565.
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as alleged here, she is driven to quit an education program because of
the severity of the sexual harassment she is forced to endure in the
program.'4
B. Missing Links in the Title VII/Title 1X Analysis
Other circuits have declined to apply a Title VII sexual harassment
analysis in a Title IX context. In Bougher v. University of
Pittsburgh,145 the Third Circuit declined to determine whether
evidence of a hostile environment is sufficient to sustain a claim of
sexual discrimination in education in violation of Title IX, "important
though it may be," because the statute of limitations had expired.'46
The Eleventh Circuit in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools 14 also declined to apply Title VII sexual harassment theories
to a Title IX case because it would not result "in the kind of orderly
analysis so necessary in this confusing area of law.' 48  The conflict
among the courts in deciding whether to apply Title VII sexual
harassment theories in Title IX cases only illustrates the need to issue
a definitive answer. Adopting sexual harassment theories already well-
developed in Title VII case law provides a logical answer to the
question.
C. A Final Link
The final link between Title VII and Title IX is that the remedies
available under each statute are now similar. The Supreme Court in
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools'4 9  determined that
damages should be available under Title IX because limiting a student's
remedy to equitable relief may be inadequate.5  Recoupment of
attorney's fees is also already established under Title IX. ' Similarly,
an employee who sues under Title VII for sexual harassment may seek
remedies including injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive
144. Id. at 1575. The harassment continued after the plaintiff transferred to another public
school. Ultimately, she enrolled in a private school. Id, at 1566. The court specifically noted
that a victim may state an actionable claim for hostile environment sexual harassment without
feeling compelled to quit school. Id. at 1575 n.10.
145. 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989).
146. Id. at 77.
147. 911 F.2d 617(llth Cir. 1990), rev'd on otheri grounds, 112S. Ct 1028 (1992).
148. Id. at 622.
149. 112 S. CtL 1028 (1992).
150. Id. at 1038. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
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damages, and attorney's fees." 2 Thus, both students and employees
may seek similar remedies for sexual harassment.
Courts will continue to be faced with the decision of whether to
apply Title VII sexual harassment theories to Title IX sexual harassment
litigation. The confusion already existing in the lower courts will be
compounded by the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin to compare
student victims of sexual harassment to employee victims." 3 The
similar remedies offered under each statute will provide schools with
the same incentive employers have for ending this type of sex
discrimination. A comparison between the school and the workplace in
the following section lends credence to the idea that a hostile
environment sexual harassment theory should be extended to include
student-to-student sexual harassment under Title IX. Extending Title IX
to include hostile environment sexual harassment is reasonable given the
Supreme Court's statement that "if we are to give [Title IX] the scope
that its origins dictate, we must accord it a sweep as broad as its
language.'"154
VI. Extending the Hostile Environment Theory to Student-to-Student
Harassment
As discussed in the preceding section, courts have demonstrated a
willingness to apply Title VII sexual harassment theories to cases of
sexual harassment brought under Title IX. The Supreme Court's
comparison of students to subordinates and teachers to supervisors when
a teacher sexually harasses a student'" justifies analyzing cases of
sexual harassment in the schools using the same theories applied in the
workplace. By taking this analysis one step further, this Comment
argues that student harassment of other students should be likened to
co-worker harassment,"5 6 a practice for which an employer can be
held liable if management-level employees "knew or reasonably should
have known" of the offensive behavior.
1 57
152. 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (1991).
153. Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 1037.
154. North Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (quoting United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801 (1966)).
155. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992).
156. Although one district court has already adopted this reasoning, it is by no means a
universally accepted proposition. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D.
Cal. 1993). Legal commentators also advocate applying Title VII hostile environment sexual
harassment analysis to Title IX. See generally Monica L. Sherer, Comment, No Longer Just
Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IXfor Peer Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
2119 (1993).
157. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Hacienda
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The facts of D.R v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
School"5 8 provide a basis for establishing that student-to-student
sexual harassment creates the same type of hostile environment in the
schools that is actionable in the employment arena. This section will
establish that when female students are sexually harassed by their male
peers in school, they are discriminated against on the basis of sex in
violation of Title IX. Similarities between the employment and
educational settings provide the foundation upon which a student-to-
student sexual harassment claim under Title IX could be successful.
A. The Basic Comparison
It is generally understood that both students and employees have
"work"'5 9 to do. A student's position in the hierarchy of a school is
structurally similar to an employee's position in a business. Generally,
an employer hires supervisors to attain the employer's objective of
producing a product or performing a service. The supervisor oversees
a group of employees or co-workers who implement the plan. At
school, the school district hires administrators and teachers to attain its
goal of educating students. The administrators and teachers supervise
and teach the students the concepts they need to learn. In terms of
sexual harassment, the Fifth Circuit stated that "there is no meaningful
distinction between the work environment and the school
environment.""60
Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515 (9th Cir. 1989)). But see Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist, 830 F.
Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993). The court in Doe considered the Ellison "knew or should have
known" standard of employer liability, but declined to follow it in a case of student-to-student
sexual harassment Id. at 1572, 1575. The court concluded that with respect to student harassers
(as opposed to teachers whose agency relationship with the school district imputes liability), a
plaintiff must prove that the school district intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of
sex. Id. at 1576.
158. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (7-5 decision), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct 1045
(1993).
159. The definition of work is as follows:
[t]o exert one's self for a purpose; to put forth effort for the attainment of an object; to
be engaged in the performance of a task, duty, or the like. The term covers all forms
of physical or mental exertions, or both combined, for the attainment of some object
other than recreation or amusement
BiAcK's LAW DICToNARY 1605 (6th ed. 1990).
160. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992). In Taylor, a student
brought a Section 1983 action against the school district after she was sexually molested by her
teacher. The court held that the student had a constitutional right under the due process and equal
protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment to be free from sexual molestation by her state-
employed teacher. Id.
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Although there are basic similarities between students and
employees, there are obvious differences as well. The first difference
is that the majority of students in elementary and secondary schools are
minors whose judgment the law recognizes may not be fully mature and
developed. 6' The dissent in Middle Bucks noted that children may
not vote, may not serve in the armed forces, and must stand trial in a
juvenile court if arrested.'62 Second, the authority that school officials
exercise over students is potentially greater than the authority a
supervisor exerts over an employee. School officials are considered to
stand in loco parentis toward students to protect them from exposure to
such things as "sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech."16 School
officials may also administer corporal punishment to exercise
disciplinary control if it is required.' "
The greatest difference between a student victim of hostile
environment sexual harassment and an employee victim is that the
employee is protected from such conduct under Title VII. 61 The
Supreme Court has already taken one step toward protecting students
from sexual harassment in the school by allowing a damages remedy
under Title IX in a case of teacher-to-student harassment.166 The next
step is to offer students who are sexually harassed by their peers as
much protection under the law as employees who are harassed by co-
workers. Students' need for protection is accentuated by a potential
lack of maturity and a greater reliance on school officials to protect
them. Students and employees should be equally protected in their
respective work environments from harassment by their colleagues.
B. The Necessity of Work and School
The first comparison to be drawn between a hostile environment
sexual harassment claim at school and one in the workplace is the
necessity to attend school and report to work. In Middle Bucks,167 the
plaintiffs premised their Section 1983 claim on compulsory attendance
161. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, C.J. joined by Mansmann, Scirica, and
Nygaard, JJ., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)). Bethel
concerned a student who was disciplined for delivering a nominating speech for a fellow classmate
using a graphic and explicit sexual metaphor.
164. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380.
165. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
166. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. CL 1028 (1992).
167. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text for further discussion.
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and truancy laws.'" The plaintiffs stated that by statute they were
required to attend school until age seventeen.169 Additionally, they
were subject to penalties under truancy laws for continued periods of
unexcused absence.17 ° The majority in Middle Bucks stated that
students are required to spend "only" 180 six-hour days in the
classroom per year.'7 ' Contrary to the majority's view that schools
are "open institutions" from which a student may escape at the end of
the day to the comfort of family and friends,'72 the dissent in Middle
Bucks noted that, "[a]lthough a student is not held in school under
shackles, there is substantial compulsion associated with schooling."17'
Like a student, an employee is generally expected to report to
work, generally for eight hours a day, five days a week. In Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson,174  Vinson was discharged for taking
excessive sick leave in response to continued sexual harassment. 7 '
In both Middle Bucks and Vinson the victims may have been "free" to
extricate themselves from the abusive situation, but only if they were
willing to suffer the consequences.
In Vinson, the Court also stated that enduring sexual harassment in
the workplace should not be a requirement "for the privilege of being
allowed to work and make a living ... .'76 Likewise, the plaintiffs
in Middle Bucks should not have been required to submit to sexual
abuse at school in return for the privilege of receiving an education any
more than their counterparts in the workplace.
C. Defining a Hostile Environment
Having established that to learn one must attend school, and to
earn a living one must report to work, attention must be focused on
what conduct constitutes a hostile environment. Under Title VII, courts
have readily accepted hostile environment sexual harassment claims
which include actual sexual propositions or assault. 77  The facts of
168. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1367.
169. Id. at 1370 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit 24, § 13-1326 (1962 & Supp. 1991)).
170. Id. (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1333 and 13-1343 (1962 & Supp. 1991)).
171. Id. at 1372 (citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1327(b), 15-1501, 15-1504(a) (1962 &
Supp. 1991)).
172. Id. at 1372-73 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)).
173. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1380 (Sloviter, C.J., joined by Mansmann, Scirica, and
Nygaard, J.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Sloviter stated that due to financial constraints private
school or home schooling was an option for only "a few fortunate students." Id.
174. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
175. Id. at 60.
176. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1982)).
177. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 n.7 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
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cases such as Bundy v. Jackson,1 ' Henson v. City of Dundee,179 and
Katz v. Dole8 0 which included sexual propositions, sexual slurs, and
obscenities, were sufficient to create a hostile work environment.
The Supreme Court recently considered the definition of hostile
work environment in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc."' In Harris,
Teresa Harris alleged that Forklift's president created a hostile work
environment by insulting her because of her gender, by directing sexual
innuendos at her, and by forcing Harris and other female employees to
retrieve coins from his pockets and pick up objects off the ground."8 2
The Supreme Court rejected previous Sixth Circuit precedent which
required a serious effect on the plaintiff's psychological well-being.8 3
Instead, the Court reaffirmed the standard adopted in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, which stated that Title VII is violated "[w]hen
the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult,"'18 4 which is 'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working
environment.'"185 The Court determined that this standard strikes a
balance between merely offensive conduct and conduct which causes
psychological injury. 6 As long as both a reasonable person and the
victim perceive the environment as hostile, Title VII is violated and
proof of psychological injury is unnecessary." 7 The Supreme Court
enumerated a list of potential factors to examine to determine if a
hostile environment is created. These factors include: the frequency of
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether
it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'
U.S. 1041 (1987).
178. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
179. 682 F.2d 897 (1 1th Cir. 1982). In Henson, the plaintiff complained that her supervisor,
the chief of police, made repeated sexual inquiries, spoke vulgarly to her, and requested that she
have sexual relations with him.
180. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). In Katz, the plaintiff was subjected to vulgar, offensive,
and degrading sexual comments from her male co-workers.
181. 114 S. CL 367 (1993).
182. Id. at 369.
183. Id. at 370 (rejecting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611,620 (6th Cir. 1986),
cert denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
184. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986)).
185. Haris, 114 S.Ct. at 370 (quoting Pinson, 477 U.S. at 67).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 371. Additionally, the court stated that the employee's psychological well-being
is relevant, although no single factor is required. Id.
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The standard for defining a hostile environment promulgated in
Harris is equally applicable to the school setting. The behavior of the
male students in Middle Bucks.8 9  easily satisfies the hostile
environment definition. The plaintiffs in Middle Bucks alleged that the
molestation, which occurred several times a week over a period of five
months, consisted of the male students touching their breasts and
genitalia, forcing them to masturbate the male students and to perform
acts of fellatio on the male students, sodomizing the plaintiffs, and
forcing them to watch similar acts performed on others.'" Clearly,
in an employment context, this behavior would satisfy the hostile
environment factors set forth in Harris because the abuse was frequent,
severe, physically threatening and humiliating, and interfered with the
victims' school performance. 9'
The Supreme Court in Vinson recognized that sexual harassment
which creates a hostile or offensive environment is a form of sex
discrimination." Sexual harassment in employment is discriminatory
because it is an arbitrary barrier to sexual equality in the workplace.193
Likewise, the purpose of Title IX is to "eliminate ... discrimination on
the basis of sex in any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance .... ,194 Although only one court has tested Title
LX in a case of student-to-student sexual harassment,9 " the Supreme
Court's holding in Franklin that teacher-to-student sexual harassment
results in sex discrimination should be universally extended to include
student-to-student sexual harassment, which is equally
discriminatory. 196
D. The Consequences of Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment in the schools violates Title IX not only because
it is a form of sex discrimination, but also because it denies a person,
on the basis of sex, the benefits of an education.19' Student victims
189. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
190. Id. at 1366.
191. Id.
192. inson, 477 U.S. at 66.
193. Id. 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
194. 34 C.F.R § 106.1 (1991). See Pfeiffer v. Sch. Bd. for Marion Center Area, 917 F.2d 779
(3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a school which received federal funds for its school lunch program
was subject to Title IX).
195. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
196. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1037 (1992).
197. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a). Section 106.3 1(a) states that "no person shall, on the basis of sex,
... be denied the benefits of, any academic, extracurricular, research, occupational training, or
other education program or activity operated by recipient which receives or benefits from Federal
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of hostile environment sexual harassment in the schools have their
learning environment altered in much the same way that an employee's
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment"'98 are altered in the
workplace. When people are sexually harassed they may feel
humiliated, degraded, ashamed, embarrassed, frightened, upset, helpless,
or angry." Any of these reactions is likely to affect a person's
ability to function effectively and may cause physical repercussions as
well.2°°
Victims of sexual harassment in the workplace have experienced
negative affects on their employment. The plaintiff in Vinson, Mechelle
Vinson, acquiesced to having sexual relations with her supervisor
because she feared losing her job.20' Vinson's fear of her supervisor
also prevented her from reporting the harassment or attempting to use
the bank's complaint procedure. 2° Ultimately, she was discharged for
taking excessive sick leave in response to four years of continuous
harassment.2 3 The plaintiff in Ellison v. Brady2 °4 reported feeling
"shocked and frightened" after receiving offensive notes from a male
co-worker.2 5  The harassment disrupted Ellison's work to the point
that she obtained permission to transfer to another office in an effort to
avoid her harasser.20 6
Sexual harassment in the school yields similar results. D.R., the
plaintiff in Middle Bucks, is typical of other victims of peer sexual
harassment in the schools. D.R. chose to remain silent about the abuse
she suffered because she feared that reporting it would result in her
removal from the classroom.2 7 She had been removed from regular
financial assistance."
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
199. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 47. Student victims of peer harassment are similarly
affected. One victim, Katy Lyle, reported feeling "embarrassed and degraded," "afraid and
helpless," and "terrorized." Ms. Lyle settled her case for $15,000 and an apology. Mark
Bregman, "I'll Never Look at the World the Same Way Again, " SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, March 12,
1993, at 14.
200. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 52. A student may experience physical side affects as well. For
instance, Tawnya Brawdy was constantly harassed about the size of her breasts by eighth grade
boys at her school. She developed headaches and stomachaches in response to her harassment
Ms. Brawdy received $20,000 in an out of court settlement See Jordan, supra note 4, at Al.
201. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 60.
202. Id. at 61.
203. Id. at 60.
204. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
205. Id. at 874.
206. Id.
207. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1381. See also Amy Saltzman, It's Not Just Teasing, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1993, at 73 (citing the American Association of University Women
survey which found that only seven percent of students who are sexually harassed told a teacher
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public school to go to this vocational school and feared there was no
where else for her to go."'8 D.R. reportedly tried to avoid using the
lavatory where she was assaulted by requesting a pass to a different
lavatory, but her pleas were either ignored or refused.2"
As a victim of sexual harassment at school, D.R. was discriminated
against on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX. Title IX has often
been invoked to ensure equality in athletic programs.21° Surely it
must also include the opportunity for young women to receive an
education free of harassment. When female students are sexually
harassed, they are denied the opportunity to receive the same education
as their male peers.2" Two of the purposes of Title IX are to provide
women with the chance to "develop the skills they want" and to provide
"equal opportunity in education for men and women."212 Hostile
environment sexual harassment sets women apart from their male peers
and denies them equal educational benefits.2"'
E. Potential Liability of the Schools
To successfully maintain an action for student-to-student sexual
harassment under Title IX, a plaintiff must establish that school districts
should be held liable.2" 4 Borrowing from standards promulgated
and only twenty-three percent talked to a parent or other family member).
208. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1381.
209. Id. at 1380. Similarly, the plaintiff in Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp.
1560, 1565 (N.D. Cal. 1993) stopped going to the bathroom during the school day to avoid seeing
derogatory comments about her written on the walls.
210. See, e.g., Brenden v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Morris v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Hoover v. Meildejohn, 430 F. Supp.
164 (D. Colo. 1977). These Title IX cases challenged regulations that prohibited female students
from participating in high school athletics.
211. The AAUW survey reported that one in three girls who were harassed did not want to
go to school or speak up in class. See Jordan, supra note 4, at Al. One victim, Tawnya Brawdy,
saw her grades slip from A's and B's to C's and D's. Id
212. Haffer v. Teiple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 541 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (quoting Senator Birch
Bayh, 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (concerning alleged discrimination in Temple's intercollegiate
athletic program)).
213. See Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993), vacating as moot, 802 F. Supp.
737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). In Cook, female athletes alleged that Colgate's decision to maintain the
women's ice hockey team as a club sport violated Title IX. The court ordered Colgate to grant
the women's ice hockey team varsity status. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 751. The court stated as
follows:
Equal athletic treatment is not a luxury. It is not a luxury to grant equivalent benefits
and opportunities to women. It is not a luxury to comply with the law. Equality and
justice are not luxuries. They are essential elements which are woven into the very
fiber of this country. They are essential elements now codified under Title IX.
Id. at 750.
214. Congress has provided that states are not immune from suit under Title IX. 42 U.S.C.
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under Title VII for employer liability for co-worker harassment, school
districts should be held liable for student conduct of which they had
either actual or constructive notice and which they took no steps to
remedy.21 Holding schools accountable for the conduct of students
will promote the equal opportunities for women that Title IX was
enacted to protect.
The Supreme Court declined to definitively rule on employer
liability under Title VII for claims of sexual harassment in the
workplace.216  The Court did recommend that courts look to
guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
for guidance in this area.217  The EEOC guidelines recommend
imposing strict liability on employers only for acts of sexual harassment
committed by its agents or supervisory employees.21 In contrast, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace
between fellow employees only "where the employer (or its agents or
supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless [the employer] can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action." '219 Consistent with this standard, the Eighth Circuit
in Hall v. Gus Construction Co., Inc.220 determined that an employer
is "blameworthy" when it has reason to know one of its employees is
the victim of harassment by others in the workplace.22  The
harasser's behavior must be sufficiently "egregious, numerous, and
concentrated as to add up to a campaign of harassment" before the
employer will be held liable for failing to discover the harassment and
take remedial steps to correct it.222
§ 2000d-7. It is unclear whether school officials (including teachers and administrators) could also
be held liable in either their individual or official capacities for Title IX violations. One court
concluded that only educational institutions may be held liable under Title IX because the
institution, not individuals, receive federal funds. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist, 830 F. Supp.
1560, 1576-77 (N.D. Cal. 1993). For purposes of this Comment, it will be assumed that only
institutions, not individuals, may be held liable.
215. See also Sherer, No Longer Just Child's Play, supra note 156, at 2165-66 (arguing that
schools should be liable under the "knew or should have known" standard). But see Doe v.
Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (arguing that "knew or should
have known" standard is essentially a negligence standard and that the proper standard is whether
the school district intentionally discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of sex).
216. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
217. Id.
218. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1992).
219. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
220. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
221. Id. at 1016.
222. Id.
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The EEOC guidelines state that prevention is the key to eliminating
sexual harassment in the workplace.223 Actions such as raising the
subject, expressing strong disapproval, developing sanctions, informing
employees of sexual harassment procedures, and sensitizing employees
to the problem are affirmative steps an employer may take to either
prevent or correct occurrences of sexual harassment.224 The remedial
actions must be "reasonably calculated to end the harassment.,
22
1
Proper remedial action has included full investigation of the allegations,
issuing an official warning to the harasser, placing the harasser on
probation, and potential suspension or discharge.
226
Conditioning a school's liability on a combination of notice and
corrective action would work equally well in cases of student-to-student
sexual harassment. This approach provides a compromise between a
strict liability standard and allowing schools to escape liability
altogether. A strict liability standard would impose a greater burden on
schools than required of employers in the workplace. Allowing a
school to avoid liability provides no incentive to eliminate student-to-
student sexual harassment.
Additionally, providing schools with the opportunity to limit their
liability by taking preventive and corrective action will serve two
purposes. First, it will give school districts incentive to implement
sexual harassment policies. Minnesota and California have enacted
statutes which require schools to have policies which prohibit student-
to-student harassment, and other states are following suit.227 Second,
school officials who have notice of sexual harassment will have
223. 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(f).
224. Id.
225. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881 (quoting Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)).
226. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 881 (citing Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1987)
and Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984)).
227. See 10A MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West Supp. 1992). The statute states that each
school board shall adopt a written sexual harassment and sexual violence policy which applies to
students, teachers, administrators, and other school personnel. It includes reporting procedures and
sets forth disciplinary actions for violation of the policy. The policy must be posted conspicuously
in each school and included in each school's student handbook on school policies. See also, 26
CAL EDUC. CODE § 212.5 (West Supp. 1992); Victoria Berming, Mass. Schools Get Sex
Harassment Guidelines, BOSTON GLoBE, Dec. 2, 1993, at 39 (discussing new sexual harassment
policies being developed in Massachusettes); Galina Espinoza, Schools Getting Tough on Sexual
Harassment, PHI.A. INQUIRER, Dec. 13, 1993, at S6 (discussing sexual harassment policies in New
Jersey); S.E. Siebert, District Backs Policies on Sexual Harassment, PILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 28,
1993 (discussing sexual harassment policies being implemented in some Pennsylvania school
districts).
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additional incentive to take corrective measures to limit the school's
liability.28
Remedial steps which have been found effective in the workplace
could easily be translated to the school setting. Opening
communication with students, expressing disapproval of certain types
of behavior, developing formal grievance procedures, investigating
allegations, removing the harasser from the classroom, and enforcing
sanctions such as warnings, suspension, or expulsion would likely be
acceptable remedies.229
Adoption of these theories under Title IX would likely open the
door for greater litigation. However, since Congress enacted Title IX
to ensure sexual equality, Title IX should include sex discrimination
that results from student-to-student sexual harassment. The framework
for theories of liability for sexual harassment claims is already in place
under Title VII and should be implemented under Title IX. Holding a
school accountable if it has notice of the harassment and takes no
corrective action may prevent the facts of Middle Bucks2 ° from being
repeated in the future.2"'
VII. Conclusion
The problem of student-to-student harassment in the schools is not
going to disappear. The Supreme Court's decision to allow a plaintiff
to collect damages in an action brought to enforce Title IX, coupled
with the failure of claims under Section 1983, will only increase the
number of lawsuits brought under this statute. In addition, the Supreme
Court's assertion that teacher-to-student harassment is every bit as
discriminatory as supervisor-to-subordinate harassment will further
confuse the lower courts which must decide whether theories of sexual
228. Under the "knew or should have known" standard, a school would be held liable under
agency principles if school officials fail to respond to student complaints or fail to recognize severe
and pervasive harassment. But see Doe, 830 F. Supp. at 1576 (holding that a school district's
failure to take appropriate action in response to complaints is insufficient; the student must
establish that the school district's insufficient action or inaction amounted to intentional
discrimination); Floyd v. Waiters, 831 F. Supp. 867 (M.D. Ga. 1993) (holding that common-law
agency principles do not apply to Title IX).
229. In New Jersey, one school district proposed detention for first-time offenders, suspension
and parent conferences for second-time offenders, and suspension with recommendations for
expulsion for third-time offenders. See Espinoza, supra note 227, at S6.
230. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992).
231. In at least one school, sexual harassment policies seem to be working. Students and staff
members report that male students are "being a lot more courteous." Maia Davis, Schools Say
New State Law Has Cut Sexual Harassment on Campus, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1994, at BI.
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harassment developed in the employment setting under Title VII should
be applied under Title IX as well.
To achieve the purpose of Title IX, eliminating sex discrimination
in the schools, the issue of sexual harassment, whether perpetrated by
a teacher or student, must be fully addressed. Courts should logically
turn to the well-developed sexual harassment case law under Title VII.
Title IX was designed to protect students from sex discrimination in the
schools so that they would not be denied the benefit of any academic
or education program receiving federal funds. Students who are victims
of student-to-student sexual harassment are discriminated against on the
basis of sex and therefore deserve protection under Title IX.
Elizabeth J. Gant

